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Introduction
The 2007-2009 …nancial crisis witnessed a severe disruption of …nancial intermediation in many industrialized economies. This has led to a surge in both empirical and theoretical research aimed at understanding the causes and consequences of the …nancial crisis, evaluating the policy measures put in place to tackle its e¤ects, and proposing further policy actions and new regulatory frameworks.
A particularly in ‡uential strand of the literature has focused on the role played by the 'shadow banking'sector in the origin and propagation of the …nancial turmoil. The latter sector comprises all those …nancial intermediaries (investment banks, hedge funds, …nance companies, o¤-balancesheet investment vehicles, etc.) that have no access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees, and that are not subject to regulatory capital requirements. 1 Many of these …nancial intermediaries funded their asset purchases primarily by means of collateralized debt with very short maturity, such as sale and repurchase (repo) agreements or asset backed commercial paper (ABCP). As argued by Brunnermeier (2009) , Metrick (2010, 2011) , Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov (2012) and others, the initial losses su¤ered by some of the assets that served as collateral in repo or ABCP transactions, together with the uncertainty surrounding individual exposures to such assets, led the holders of that short-term debt (mostly institutional investors, such as money market funds) to largely stop rolling over their lending. This funding freeze forced the shadow …nancial intermediaries to deleverage, with the resulting contraction in their balance sheets and ultimately in the credit ‡ow to the real economy.
In fact, the observed deleveraging of shadow intermediaries during the 2007-2009 …nancial crisis is not an isolated episode. As documented by Shin (2010, 2011b) , since the 1960s the leverage ratio of important segments of the …nancial intermediation sector has exhibited a markedly procyclical pattern, in the sense that expansions (contractions) in balance sheet size have gone hand in hand with increases (decreases) in leverage. This procyclicality has been particularly strong in the case of security brokers and dealers, a category that used to include investment banks. Overall, these …ndings point to the importance of endogenous leverage ‡uctuations for the cyclical behavior of …nancial intermediation.
The aim of our paper is both empirical and theoretical. On the empirical front, we perform a systematic analysis of the cyclical ‡uctuations in the balance sheets of US …nancial intermediaries, with a special attention to the leverage ratio (i.e. the ratio between total assets and equity capital). Our analysis comprises the main subsectors in what Greenlaw et al. (2008) have termed the 'leveraged sector', including depository intermediaries such as US-chartered commercial banks and savings institutions, as well as non-depository intermediaries such as security broker/dealers and …nance companies. Our empirical …ndings can be summarized as follows. First, leverage contributes at least as much as equity to the cyclical movements in total assets. Second, leverage, equity capital and total assets are several times more volatile than GDP. Third, leverage is negatively correlated with equity. Finally, leverage is positively correlated with total assets and (to a lesser extent) GDP. 2 Importantly, these facts are robust across subsectors, regardless of whether they represent depository or non-depository institutions. In addition, these …ndings are fairly robust to the …ltering process, the type of assets considered (total or …nancial) and the sample period.
On the theoretical front, we construct a general equilibrium model of …nancial intermediation and endogenous leverage, and assess its ability to match the evidence discussed above. The model incorporates a …nancial intermediation sector consisting of banks that borrow from institutional investors in the form of short-term collateralized risky debt. The source of risk in banks' debt 1 See Pozsar et al. (2012) for an in-depth analysis of 'shadow banking'in the United States. 2 In the case of security broker/dealers, the procyclicality of leverage with respect to assets con…rms the original …ndings by Adrian and Shin (2010) . Like them, we use Flow of Funds data. Our analysis of the data is somewhat di¤erent though. Whereas Adrian and Shin focus on the growth rates of leverage and assets, we focus on their cyclical components as implied by a standard bandpass …lter. We also consider real rather than nominal assets, given our interest in their comovements with real GDP and for consistency with our theoretical model. Using data from the FDIC Call Reports, Adrian and Shin (2011b) obtain a positive comovement between assets and leverage also for commercial banks.
is the following. Banks invest in the non…nancial corporate (…rm) sector. Banks and …rms are segmented across islands, and …rms are hit by island-speci…c shocks. Therefore, banks are exposed to island-speci…c risk, such that a fraction of them declare bankruptcy and default on their debt in each period.
Banks' leverage is endogenously determined by market forces. In particular, we assume the existence of a moral hazard problem based on the one developed by Adrian and Shin (2011a) in a static, partial equilibrium context. 3 Due to limited liability, the payo¤ structure of a bank resembles that of a call option on island-speci…c risk. 4 That is, banks enjoy the upside risk in their assets over and above the face value of their debt, leaving institutional investors to bear the downside risk. This provides banks with an incentive to engage in ine¢ ciently risky lending practices. Such an incentive increases with the assumed debt commitment relative to the size of the bank's balance sheet. In order to induce each bank to invest e¢ ciently, institutional investors restrict their lending to a certain ratio of the bank's net worth, i.e. they impose a leverage constraint.
We then calibrate our model to the US economy and analyze its dynamic properties. In particular, we study the model economy's response to two exogenous driving forces: total factor productivity (TFP), and time-varying volatility of island-speci…c shocks. While TFP shocks are fairly standard in the real business cycle literature, changes in cross-sectional volatility have received considerable attention recently as a source of aggregate ‡uctuations. 5 Our results show that TFP shocks by themselves are unable to replicate the volatility of leverage in the data, as well as its procyclicality with respect to GDP. Intuitively, TFP shocks barely a¤ect banks'risk-taking incentives. On the contrary, shocks to cross-sectional volatility are able to produce ‡uctuations in leverage of a realistic size, as well as a positive comovement between leverage and GDP. The mechanism is as follows. Consider e.g. an increase in island-speci…c volatility. Higher uncertainty regarding asset returns, coupled with limited liability, makes it more attractive for banks to engage in ine¢ ciently risky lending practices. In order to prevent them from doing so, institutional investors impose a tighter constraint on banks'leverage. For given net worth, this deleveraging forces banks to contract their balance sheets, thus producing a fall in intermediated credit. This leads to a fall in capital investment by …rms, and in aggregate output. The consequence is a positive comovement between leverage, assets and GDP. In fact, volatility shocks alone generate a procyclicality of leverage above the empirical one. Combining the latter shocks with TFP shocks improves the model's performance, by reducing the correlation with GDP to a level that is comparable with that in the data.
Finally, we use our model as a laboratory for studying how the steady-state level of crosssectional volatility a¤ects both the mean level and the volatility of economic activity. We …nd that lower cross-sectional volatility raises the mean level of banks'leverage, through a channel very similar to the one described above. This produces an increase in the mean levels of intermediated assets, and hence in the mean levels of capital investment and GDP. Perhaps more surprisingly, lower cross-sectional uncertainty raises the volatility of GDP. A reduction in cross-sectional volatility allows banks to increase their leverage, which generates larger ‡uctuations in total intermediated assets and hence in aggregate output. This result, which may be thought of as a 'risk diversi…cation paradox', is reminiscent of Minsky's (1992) '…nancial instability hypothesis,'according to which a lower perception of uncertainty leads to riskier investment practices, thus creating the conditions for the emergence of a …nancial crisis. In our model, lower perceived risk leads …nancial intermediaries to raise their leverage ratios, thus making the economy more vulnerable to the e¤ects of negative aggregate shocks.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the macroeconomic e¤ects of …nancial frictions. On the one hand, a recent literature has provided theoretical explanations for the 'leverage cycles' discussed above, with contributions by Adrian and Shin (2011a), Ashcraft, Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011), Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2011), Geanakoplos (2010) , and Gorton and Ordoñez (2011), among others. 6 Most of these models consider some type of link between changes in 'uncertainty', typically de…ned as changes in the volatility of shocks, and the emergence of these leverage cycles. While these models provide important insights on the equilibrium behavior of leverage, they are primarily aimed at illustrating theoretical mechanisms and are thus mainly qualitative. In particular, most of these papers consider two-or three-period economies, or two-period-lived agents (i.e. an OLG structure); they also assume a partial equilibrium structure. 7 We build on this literature by analyzing endogenous leverage cycles in a fully dynamic, general equilibrium model that can be compared to aggregate data and, more generally, be useful for quantitative analysis.
On the other hand, our paper is related to a growing literature on the role of …nancial intermediaries in DSGE models. Early contributions, such as Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , emphasized the importance of …nan-cial frictions for the macroeconomy, but largely obviated the role played by …nancial intermediaries. In recent years, and largely motivated by the recent …nancial crisis, a number of papers study how frictions arising in the …nancial intermediation sector a¤ect credit ‡ows to the real economy. In the model of Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010), banks incur a cost when creating liabilities that provide liquidity services, such as deposits. In Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) , banks are leverage constrained due to a moral hazard problem di¤erent from the one used here. 8 The authors focus their discussion on how changes in bank equity capital a¤ect bank credit supply for given leverage, and how unconventional policy interventions can mitigate the e¤ects of adverse shocks on …nancial intermediation. He and Krishnamurthy (2012) propose a framework with …nancial intermediaries subject to occasionally binding capital constraints, and use it to explain the nonlinear behavior of risk premia during crises and to evaluate di¤erent policy interventions. Boissay, Collard and Smets (2012) consider a model of heterogeneous …nancial intermediaries where moral hazard and asymmetric information may generate sudden interbank market freezes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence on the cyclical behavior of GDP, assets and leverage of …nancial intermediaries in the US. Section 3 lays out the model. Section 4 calibrates and simulates the model, assessing its ability of replicate the data. Section 5 concludes.
Bank leverage cycles in the US economy
By de…nition, the size of a …nancial intermediary's balance sheet is the product of two components: its equity capital, and its leverage ratio. We thus have the following identity: A = N , where A denotes total assets, represents the leverage ratio, and N is equity capital. In logs, we have log(A) = log( ) + log(N ):
Applying a linear trend-cycle …lter on both sides of (1) yields the same identity for the cyclical components of the three variables. Such an identity raises a number of empirical questions. First, it is interesting to ask what is the relative contribution of leverage and equity capital to the cyclical ‡uctuations in total assets. Second, one may wonder how leverage and equity correlate with each other, and how each component correlates with total assets. 9 A related question is how the leverage ratio and the assets of …nancial intermediaries comove with aggregate economic activity, as represented by real GDP. Last but not least, the size of ‡uctuations in leverage, assets and equity relative to those in real economic activity is itself a matter of empirical interest. Table 1 displays a number of statistics regarding the cyclical ‡uctuations in leverage, equity capital, total assets and GDP in the United States, for the period 1963:Q1-2011:Q3. 10 Our leverage, equity and assets series are constructed using data from the US Flow of Funds. 11 We consider four leveraged …nancial subsectors: US-chartered commercial banks, savings institutions, security brokers and dealers and …nance companies. US-chartered commercial banks and savings institutions are both depository institutions, whereas security broker/dealers and …nance companies are nondepository and belong to what Pozsar et al. (2012) have de…ned as the 'shadow banking'sector.
Given the information in Table 1 , four stylized facts should be underlined:
1. Leverage is volatile. A …rst conclusion to extract is that the leverage ratios of the di¤erent subsectors are fairly volatile. In all cases, leverage ‡uctuates more than equity capital, as shown by the standard deviations. Leverage of security broker/dealers and …nance companies (both non-depository subsectors) is about 7 and 3 times larger than that of GDP, respectively. The leverage of savings institutions (a depository subsector) displays a high volatility too, due mainly to the savings and loans crisis episode in the 1980s. For commercial banks, the leverage ratio ‡uctuates comparatively less, although its standard deviation is still about twice that of GDP.
2. Leverage and equity comove negatively. A second stylized fact is that leverage and assets tend to comove negatively over the business cycle. This can be easily understood by taking into account that var(log A) = var(log ) + var(log N ) + 2cov(log ; log N ). If the variance of leverage is roughly of the same order of magnitude than that of assets and equity, then necessarily it must be negatively correlated with equity. Thus, equity typically increases in deleveraging periods, and viceversa. This negative correlation is large for the four subsectors, ranging from -0.88 for savings institutions to -0.54 for security broker/dealers.
3. Leverage and assets comove positively. A third lesson to draw is that assets and leverage tend to comove positively over the business cycle. This pattern is particular strong for security broker/dealers and …nance companies. As shown in Table 1 , for the latter subsectors both variables have a contemporaneous correlation of 0.65 at business cycle frequencies. This observation con…rms the original …nding of Adrian and Shin (2010) , albeit with a di¤erent treatment of the data. 12 As explained by these authors, such a strong comovement reveals an active management of leverage as a means of expanding and contracting the size of balance sheets. For the other subsectors, the correlation coe¢ cients are smaller, but statistically signi…cant in all cases. 4 . Leverage (and assets) are procyclical. The …nal lesson to draw is that both leverage and assets tend to comove positively with GDP. In particular, the leverage of …nancial intermediaries displays a mildly procyclical behavior. The correlation of the di¤erent leverage ratios with GDP ranges from 0.12 to 0.36, and while they are relatively small, they are all 9 For a seminal study of cyclical comovements between leverage and total assets of US …nancial intermediaries, see Adrian and Shin (2010) .
1 0 The cyclical component is obtained by detrending each series with a bandpass …lter that preserves cycles of 6 to 32 quarters and with lag length of K = 12 quarters (Baxter and King, 1999) . Notice that the linear identity in (1) is preserved by the bandpass …lter. 1 1 See the Data Appendix for details on the sources and the treatment of the data. 1 2 Adrian and Shin (2010) focus on the comovement between the growth rates of leverage and nominal total assets. Here, we focus on the behavior of real total assets, due both to our interest in the comovement of …nancial variables with real GDP and for consistency with our subsequent theoretical model. Also, we use a standard band-pass …lter so as to extract the cyclical component of assets and leverage. Our results show that Adrian and Shin's (2010) …ndings are robust to this di¤erent transformation of the data. statistically signi…cant (with the exception of savings institutions). The correlation between assets and GDP is higher in all cases, ranging from 0.42 in the case of security traders to 0.71 for savings institutions.
As a graphical illustration, Figure 1 shows the cyclical components of total assets and leverage for the two largest leveraged …nancial subsectors in the United States: US-chartered commercial banks, and security brokers and dealers. 13 The recession starting in 2007 witnessed a sharp decline in the leverage ratio of security broker/dealers, and an incipient decline in that of commercial banks. A similar deleveraging process was observed during the mid-70s recession. However, other recessions such as the 1981-82 one have not had any noticeable e¤ect on the leverage of these two subsectors. This explains their relatively low cyclicality with respect to GDP. Notice also that the strong correlation of commercial banks' assets and leverage at the beginning of the sample has weakened somewhat over time, while such comovement seems to have been more stable for security broker/dealers. Figure 2 displays the cyclical comovement between leverage and equity capital, again for commercial banks and security broker/dealers. The negative correlation between both variables is evident in the case of commercial banks, and less clear for broker/dealers. For instance, the recent recession featured an increase in equity of commercial banks, unlike that of broker/dealers. For the latter subsector, the negative correlation in Table 2 is the product of earlier historical episodes, such as the two recessions in the 1970s. Table 1 reveals a fair degree of heterogeneity among …nancial subsectors. To illustrate this, the last column of Table 1 reports the range of values for each moment. In light of this heterogeneity, it would be interesting to consolidate the balance sheets of the di¤erent subsectors so as to study the cyclical properties of the leveraged …nancial system as a whole. Unfortunately, the Flow of Funds data does not allow this possibility, because asset and liability positions between the di¤erent subsectors are not netted out. As a result, simply adding assets and equity would lead to a doublecounting of such cross positions. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the stylized facts discussed above are robust across …nancial subsectors.
The above empirical …ndings are also robust in other dimensions. First, we have repeated the analysis using a Hodrick-Prescott …lter instead of a bandpass one. Second, we have replaced 'total assets' by 'total …nancial assets', which are also available in the Flow of Funds. In both cases quantitative results change very little.
14 Finally, we have restricted the sample period by starting it in 1984, instead of in 1963. Our motivation for doing so is the fact the US …nancial system has experienced substantial structural transformations during the postwar period, which raises the question as to how robust the business cycle statistics in Table 1 are to considering di¤erent subsamples. Results are shown in Table 2 . In this case, the stylized facts hold qualitatively. The only exception is that the correlations of commercial banks'assets and leverage with GDP are no longer statistically signi…cant.
Notice …nally that the equity capital series from the Flow of Funds are of book equity, i.e. the di¤erence between the value of intermediaries'portfolio of claims and their liabilities. An alternative measure of equity is the market capitalization, i.e. the market value of intermediaries'traded shares. As argued by Adrian, Colla and Shin (2012), book equity is the appropriate notion of equity if one is interested in the supply of bank credit, as we are here, whereas market capitalization would have been more appropriate if one were interested in new share issuance or mergers and acquisitions decisions.
To summarize, our empirical analysis reveals four main …ndings regarding the US leveraged …nancial sector. First, the leverage ratio of the di¤erent subsectors display large ‡uctuations, contributing more than equity capital to cyclical movements in total assets. Second, leverage comoves negatively with equity. Third, leverage comoves positively with total assets. Finally, leverage is mildly procyclical with respect to GDP. In what follows, we present a general equilibrium model aimed at explaining the ‡uctuations in the leverage ratio of US …nancial intermediaries.
Model
The model economy is composed of …ve types of agents: households, …nal good producers ('…rms' for short), capital producers, institutional investors, and banks. 15 On the …nancial side, the model structure is as follows. Households lend to institutional investors in the form of deposits and equity. Institutional investors use the latter funds to lend to banks in the form of short-term, collateralized debt. Banks combine their external funding (short-term debt) and their own accumulated net worth to invest in …rms. We assume no frictions in the relationship between banks and …rms, such that the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies to …rm …nancing. For simplicity, following Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) we assume that …rms issue perfectly state-contingent debt only, which can be interpreted as equity. Banks and …rms are segmented across islands, where the latter are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Banks are thus exposed to island-speci…c risk, such that a fraction of them declare bankruptcy and default on their debt each period. Banks'debt is not guaranteed, and is therefore risky. Institutional investors operate economy-wide and diversify perfectly across islands; in fact, their only role in our model is to insulate households from islandspeci…c risk, which allows us to make use of the representative household construct.
The real side of the model is fairly standard. At the end of each period, after production has taken place, …rms use borrowed funds to purchase physical capital from capital producers. At the beginning of the following period, …rms combine their stock of capital and households' supply of labor to produce a …nal good. The latter is purchased by households for consumption purposes, and by capital producers. After production, …rms sell their depreciated capital stock to capital producers, who use the latter and the …nal goods to produce new capital. The markets for labor, physical capital and the …nal good are all nation-wide.
We now analyze the behavior of each type of agent. All variables are expressed in real terms, with the …nal good acting as the numeraire.
Households
The representative household's utility is
where C t is consumption and L t is labor supply. The budget constraint is
where D t and N II t are deposits and equity holdings at institutional investors, R D t 1 is the riskless gross deposit rate, R N t is the gross return on institutional investor equity, W t is the wage, and b t are lump-sum net dividend payments from the household's ownership of banks. As we will see later on, b t incorporates any equity injections by households into banks. The …rst order conditions are
where
In an earlier version of this paper (Nuño and Thomas, 2012), we consider a version of our model with two banking sectors that operate in parallel: an 'unregulated'sector that …nances itself with equity and collateralized debt (which corresponds to the banking sector here), and a 'regulated'sector that …nances itself with equity and deposits, whereby the latter are guaranteed by the government and banks are subject to minimum capital requirements. In that model version, endogenous ‡uctuations in leverage take place in the unregulated sector but not in the regulated one. 8 is the stochastic discount factor.
Firms
The …nal good is produced by perfectly competitive …rms. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) , we assume that …rms are segmented across a continuum of 'islands', indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. These islands may be interpreted as regions, or alternatively as sectors. The representative …rm in island j starts period t with a stock K j t of physical capital, purchased at the end of period t 1. The …rm then receives an island-speci…c shock ! j t that changes the amount of e¤ective capital to ! j t K j t . The shock ! j t is iid over time and across islands. Let F (!; t 1 ) F t 1 (!) denote the cumulative distribution function of island-speci…c shocks at time t, where t 1 denotes the standard deviation of log ! j t . The latter standard deviation follows an exogenous process. Notice that the standard deviation of island-speci…c shocks in a given period is known one period in advance. We also assume that ! j has a unit mean, E ! j = 1.
E¤ective capital is combined with labor to produce units of …nal good, Y j t , according to a Cobb-Douglas technology,
where Z t is an exogenous aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) process. The …rm maximizes operating pro…ts,
The …rst order condition is
Therefore, the e¤ective capital-labor ratio is equalized across islands:
for all j. The …rm's pro…ts are given by
is the return on e¤ective capital, which is equalized too across islands. After production, the …rm sells the depreciated e¤ective capital (1 ) ! j K j t to capital producers at price one. The total cash ‡ow from the …rm's investment project, equal to the sum of operating pro…ts and proceeds from the sale of depreciated capital, is given by
The capital purchase in the previous period was …nanced entirely by state-contingent debt. In particular, the cash ‡ow in (4) is paid o¤ entirely to the lending banks. At the end of period t, the …rm buys K j t+1 units of new capital at price one for production in t + 1. In order to …nance this purchase, the …rm issues a number of claims on next period's cash ‡ow equal to the number of capital units acquired, K j t+1 . Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), we assume that the …rm can only borrow from banks located on the same island. In particular, the …rm sells A j t claims to banks on island j. The …rm's balance sheet constraint is thus simply
Capital producers
There is a representative, perfectly competitive capital producer. At the beginning of each period, after production of …nal goods has taken place, the capital producer purchases the stock of depreciated capital (1 ) K t from …rms at price one. Used capital can be transformed into new capital on a one-to-one basis at no cost. Capital producers also purchase …nal goods in the amount I t , which are used to produce new capital goods on a one-to-one basis. At the end of the period, the new capital is sold to the …rms at price one. In equilibrium, capital producers make zero pro…ts.
Banks
In each island j there exists a representative bank. After production in period t, island j's …rm pays the bank its share of the cash ‡ow from the investment project, R
Therefore, the gross rate of return on the bank's assets is
Regarding the liabilities side of its balance sheet, the bank borrows from institutional investors by means of one-period collateralized risky debt contracts. The collateralized risky debt contracts may be thought of as sale and repurchase (repo) agreements. Under the risky debt contract, at the end of period t 1 the bank sells its …nancial claims A j t 1 (which serve as collateral) to the institutional investor at price B j t 1 , and agrees to repurchase them at the beginning of time t at a non-state-contingent price B j t 1 . At the beginning of period t, the proceeds from the bank's assets, R given by For non-defaulting banks, following Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) we assume that a random fraction 1 of them close down for exogenous reasons each period, at which point the net worth accumulated in each bank is reverted to the household. 16 The remaining fraction of banks continue operating. For the latter, the ‡ow of dividends distributed to the household is given by
where N j t is net worth after dividends have been paid. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), we assume that households inject equity in new banks, but cannot inject equity in continuing banks. Therefore, continuing banks are subject to a non-negativity constraint on dividends, j t 0, or equivalently,
Once the bank has decided how much net worth to hold, it purchases claims on …rm pro…ts, A j t , subject to its balance sheet constraint,
When borrowing from the institutional investor, the bank faces two constraints. First, a participation constraint requires that the institutional investor is willing to fund the bank. Indeed, the institutional investor may alternatively lend at the riskless deposit rate R D t . The latter investment has a present discounted value of
, where we have used the household's Euler equation and the bank's balance sheet constraint. Therefore, the participation constraint takes the form
Second, in the spirit of Adrian and Shin (2011a) we assume that once the bank has received the funding it may choose to invest in either of two …rm segments within its island: a 'standard' segment, and a 'substandard' segment. Both segments di¤er only in the distribution of islandspeci…c returns, given by F t (!) andF t (!) F (!; t ) respectively. The substandard technology has lower average payo¤, R !dF t (!) < R !dF t (!) = 1, and is thus ine¢ cient. Furthermore, F t (!) is assumed to …rst-order stochastically dominateF t (!):F t (!) > F t (!) for all ! > 0. Therefore, the substandard technology has higher downside risk. In order to induce the bank to invest in the standard segment, the institutional investor imposes an incentive compatibility (IC) constraint. Let V t+1 (!; A j t ; B j t ) denote the value function at time t + 1 of a continuing bank, to be de…ned below. Then the IC constraint takes the following form,
To understand the bank's incentives to …nance one …rm segment or another, notice that its expected net payo¤, conditional on a particular aggregate state at time t + 1, can be expressed as Z
The integral represents the value of a call option on island-speci…c returns with strike price equal to the default threshold, ! j t+1 , or equivalently to the (normalized) face value of debt, B j t =R A t+1 A j t . Intuitively, limited liability implies that the bank enjoys the upside risk in asset returns over and above the face value of its debt, but does not bear the downside risk, which is transferred to the institutional investor. Furthermore, the value of the call option on island-speci…c risk may be expressed as
Therefore, given the (normalized) face value of its debt, the bank's expected net payo¤ increases with the mean island-speci…c return, R !dF t (!), but also with the value of the put option on island-speci…c returns with strike price
The put option value under the substandard technology, which we denote by~ t ( ! j t+1 ), is de…ned analogously, withF t replacing F t . Given our assumptions on both distributions, it can be shown
18 Therefore, when choosing between investment strategies, the bank trades o¤ the higher mean return of investing in the standard …rm segment against the lower put option value. Furthermore, letting
) denote the di¤erence in put option values, we have that
the incentive to invest in the riskier …rm segment increases with the (normalized) debt commitment.
We are ready to spell out the bank's maximization problem. Let V t (!; A j t 1 ; B j t 1 ) denote the value function of a non-defaulting bank at time t before paying out dividends, and let V t (N j t ) denote the bank's value function after paying out dividends and at the time of borrowing from the institutional investor. We then have the following Bellman equations:
subject to (6) and (7); and
subject to (5), (8) Proposition 1 (Solution to the bank' s problem) Assume the model parameters satisfy
where R A and ! j are the steady-state values of R A t and ! j t , respectively. Then the equilibrium dynamics of bank j in a neighborhood of the deterministic steady state are characterized by the following features:
1. The bank optimally retains all earnings,
where b t 1 is equalized across islands.
2. The IC constraint holds with equality. In equilibrium, the latter can be expressed as
and t+1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the participation constraint. Both ! t+1 and t+1 are equalized across islands.
3. The participation constraint holds with equality, 
According to (12) , the (normalized) repurchase price b t is set such that the gain in mean return from investing in the standard …rm segment exactly compensates the bank for the loss in the put option value. According to (13) , the bank's demand for assets equals its net worth times a leverage ratio t which is equalized across islands. Notice that leverage decreases with the left tail risk of the bank's portfolio, as captured by the put option value ( ! t+1 ; t ). Intuitively, since all the downside risk in the bank's assets is born by the institutional investor, a higher perception of such risk leads the latter to impose a tighter leverage constraint.
Once b t and t have been determined, it is straightforward to obtain the actual loan size, B
Institutional investors
A representative, perfectly competitive institutional investor collects funds from households in the form of deposits and equity, and lends these funds to banks through short-term collateralized debt. Its balance sheet is thus N II t +D t = B t , where
There is no friction in the relationship between households and institutional investors. We assume that equity is su¢ ciently high to absorb aggregate risk and thus make deposits e¤ectively safe. The institutional investor operates economywide and hence perfectly diversi…es its portfolio across islands. The institutional investor's return from …nancing the island-j bank is
Aggregating across islands and substracting gross interest payments on deposits, we obtain the return on the institutional investor's equity,
where in the second equality we have used the fact ! j is distributed independently from N j t 1 , and where N t 1 R 1 0 N j t 1 dj is aggregate net worth of banks. The institutional investor distributes all earnings to the household in every period.
Aggregation and market clearing
Aggregate net worth of banks at the end of period t, N t , is the sum of the net worth of continuing banks, N Aggregating across islands, we obtain the total net worth of continuing banks,
where we have used the fact that ! j is distributed independently from N j t 1 . Banks that default or exit the market exogenously are replaced by an equal number of new banks,
We assume that new banks are endowed by households with a fraction of total assets at the beginning of the period,
We thus have
New banks leverage their starting net worth with the same ratio as continuing banks. We thus have
Aggregate net dividends to households from banks are given, by
Market clearing for capital requires that total demand by …rms equals total supply by capital producers,
The aggregate capital stock evolves as follows,
The total issuance of state-contingent claims by …rms must equal total demand by banks,
Aggregating across islands and imposing labor market clearing, we have
where we have used the fact that ! j and K j t are distributed independently and the fact that ! j has unit mean. Equations (3) and (15) then imply that
Using the latter and (2), aggregate supply of the …nal good by …rms equals
Finally, total supply of the …nal good must equal consumption demand by households and investment demand by capital producers,
Comparison to RBC model
Appendix C summarizes the equilibrium conditions in our model, and compares it with a standard RBC model. As we show there, the RBC model shares all its equilibrium conditions with our model, except for the investment Euler equation, given by
The equation that determines leverage in our framework (13) can be rewritten in an analogous form,
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A comparison of equations (17) and (16) reveals that the term
in equation (17) is a su¢ cient statistic for measuring the di¤erence in equilibrium dynamics between both models. Using t = A t =N t and the de…nition of the put option value t ( ! t+1 ) (equation 10), we can write
where in the second equality we have used ! t+1 = B t =(R A t+1 A t ) and A t N t = B t . Expression (18) is just the return on aggregate collateralized debt, B t . Therefore, t ( ! t+1 ; t ) captures the fraction of the total return on capital, R A t+1 , that is received by the household (through the institutional investor). In the absence of …nancial frictions, households receive the entire return on capital and t ( ! t+1 ; t ) is simply 1. 19 With …nancial frictions, we generally have t ( ! t+1 ; t ) 6 = 1, which drives a wedge between investment decisions in our model and in the RBC model. Importantly, the cross-sectional volatility shock t is absent from the equilibrium conditions in the RBC model, implying that such a shock has no e¤ect whatsoever in the latter model. In our framework, on the contrary, the presence of …nancial frictions opens a link between cross-sectional volatility in asset returns and aggregate investment dynamics.
Quantitative Analysis

Calibration and steady state
We calibrate our model to the US economy for the period 1984:Q1-2011:Q3. The parameters are shown in Table 3 . We may divide the parameters between those that are standard in the real business cycle (RBC) literature, and those that are particular to the …nancial structure of the model. From now onwards, we let variables without time subscripts denote steady-state values.
We set the RBC parameters to standard values. In particular, we set = 0:99 = 1=R, = 0:36 = 1 W L=Y , = 0:025 = I=K, which are broadly consistent with long-run averages for the real interest rate, the labor share, and the investment to capital ratio. For future use, we note that the steady-state return on banks'assets is R A = (Y =K) + 1 . We target a capital-output ratio of K=Y = 8, with is consistent with a ratio of investment over GDP of 20 percent, roughly in line with the historical evidence. We then have R A = 1:02. Our functional forms for preferences are standard:
. We set ' = 1, in line with other macroeconomic studies (see e.g. Comin and Gertler, 2006) . We assume an AR(1) process for the natural log of TFP,
where " z t
iid N (0; z ). Our empirical counterpart for log (Z t =Z) is the quarterly TFP series constructed by the CSIP at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, after being logged and linearly detrended. 20 We then choose z and z so as to match their empirical counterparts. Z is chosen such that steady-state output is normalized to one.
Regarding the parameters related to the …nancial side of the model, our calibration strategy is as follows. Ideally, one would consolidate the balance sheets of the di¤erent …nancial subsectors so as to calibrate the model to the leveraged …nancial sector as a whole. As explained in section 2, this consolidation is however not feasible, due to the existence of cross-positions among …nancial subsectors and the need to avoid double-counting. For this reason, we choose to set the steady-state leverage ratio to match the average leverage ratio of the four type of banks during our sample period, = 18:3. The latter implies a repo loan-to-value ratio of b = B=A = ( 1) = = 0:9454, or equivalently a repo haircut of 5:46%; the latter is in line with average haircuts for repos backed by corporate debt and private-label ABS, as documented by Krishnamurthy et al. (2012) . The same authors show that the spread between the repo rates for the same collateral categories and the Fed funds rate was close to zero in the pre-crisis period. Based on this, we target a spread in short-term collateralized debt contracts of 25 annualized basis points. The repo rate then equals R = R (1:0025) 1=4 = 1:0107. The face value of repo debt (normalized by assets) is then b = Rb = 0:9555. This implies a default threshold of ! = b=R A = 0:9368. Island-speci…c shocks are assumed to be lognormally distributed. In particular, the distribution of island-speci…c shocks to the standard and the substandard …rm segment is given by
respectively. Therefore, F (!; t ) =
, where ( ) is the standard normal cdf. The parameters > 0 and > 1 control, respectively, the mean and the variance of the substandard technology relative to the standard one. Notice in particular that
These distributional assumptions imply the following expressions for the values of the unit put options on island-speci…c risk,
The standard deviation of island-speci…c shocks is assumed to follow an AR(1) process in logs,
where " t iid N (0; ). In order to calibrate , we notice that the participation constraint (eq. 13) in the steady state implies ( !; ) = ! (1 1= ) = R A = 0:0006. Using the steady-state counterpart of (19), we can then solve for = 0:0373. The default rate of banks in the steady state then equals F ( !; ) = 4:17%. In order to calibrate the parameters governing the dynamics of island-speci…c volatility ( ; ), we use the TFP series for all 4-digit SIC manufacturing industries constructed by the NBER and the US Census Bureau's Center for Economic Studies (CES). We then construct a time series for t by calculating the cross-sectional standard deviation of the industry-level TFP series (in log deviations from a linear trend) at each point in time. Fitting an autoregressive process to the resulting series, we obtain = 0:9457 and = 0:0465.
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Regarding the parameters of the substandard technology, and , we make use of the IC constraint in the steady state,
where~ ( !; ) is given by expression (20) in the steady state. We thus have one equation for two unknowns, and . We choose to set to 0:001 to replicate the midpoint of the range of standard deviations of equity, and use the IC constraint to solve for = 1:2691. This implies that shocks to the substandard …rm segment are p = 1:1 times more volatile than the standard one.
Finally, the exogenous bank continuation rates and the bank equity injection parameter are calibrated as follows. In the steady state, the law of motion of bank net worth (eq. 14) becomes
where we have normalized by A. Equation (21) implies that is a decreasing function of , given the other parameters and steady state values. In the choice of , we are restricted by the requirement that 0, which holds for 0:84. We notice that in equilibrium 1= (1 ) represents the average frequency of dividend payments by banks. We set to 0.75, such that banks pay dividends once a year on average. We then use (21) to solve for = 0:0207.
The response to TFP shocks
We follow the lead of the traditional RBC literature by exploring how well a TFP shock can explain the unconditional patterns found in the data. Table 4 displays the second-order moments of interests. They include the standard deviations of GDP, assets, equity and leverage, as well as the correlations of assets, equity and GDP with leverage, and the correlation between assets and GDP. We also show the range of moments across subsectors for the 1984-2011 sample (see Table 2 ), as the model is calibrated to replicate this period. Model moments are based on simulated series. In order to make the model moments comparable with the empirical ones, we …rst log the simulated series and …lter them using the same bandpass …lter as the one applied to the data. 23 As shown by the third column of Table 4 , conditional on TFP shocks the model replicates fairly well the standard deviation of GDP, and the correlation between assets and GDP is not outside the empirical range. However, the model fails dramatically at reproducing the volatility of assets, equity and leverage. It also fails to produce any meaningful procyclicality in the leverage ratio or to capture the high negative correlation between leverage and equity.
To understand these results, Figure 3 displays the impulse responses to a negative TFP shock (black dotted line). 24 On impact, the fall in TFP produces a sharp fall in the return on assets, which increases the number of bankruptcies in the banking sector. The fall in the pro…tability of banks'investments reduces their equity. The leverage ratio barely reacts; indeed, the latter responds mainly to expected changes in the default threshold (see eq. 13), which is virtually back to baseline after the impact period. This explains the low volatility of leverage and its lack of correlation with output. Since their leverage remains stable, bank assets basically reproduce the response of their net worth; i.e. the e¤ects of TFP shocks on bank credit operate mainly through the equity channel. Since net worth responds relatively little, so do assets, hence their low volatility. Figure 4 compares the response to the negative TFP shock in our model and in the basic RBC model. 25 The …nancial friction in our model ampli…es the percentage decline in investment and the capital stock relative to the RBC framework. This is due to a fall in the expected …nancial wedge t ( ! t+1 ; t ) on impact, which discourages investment; it is also due to a stronger fall in the aggregate return on capital, R A t+1 . The percentage decline in consumption is also stronger. However, the percentage fall in output is very similar in both cases, due to the higher investment share of GDP in the RBC model. 2 3 In particular, we simulate the model for 55,000 periods and discard the …rst 5,000 observations to eliminate the e¤ect of initial conditions. The model is solved by means of a second-order perturbation method (in levels). The code has been implemented in Dynare. 2 4 To compute the impulse responses, the model is solved by means of a …rst-order perturbation method (in levels). 2 5 The parameters of the RBC model ( , , , ', Z, z , z ) are exactly the same as in our model. The steady state equilibrium di¤ers however in both frameworks. In particular, the absence of a …nancial wedge in the RBC model ( = 1, versus = 0:9903 in our model) implies a higher capital stock (12.23, vs 8), higher output (1.19, vs 1), etc. 2 6 The percentage output change is simply the average of the percentage changes in consumption and investment, In our model, an increase in the standard deviation of island-speci…c shocks, t , induces a reduction in the leverage of banks, via a mechanism close to the one described in Adrian and Shin (2011a) and sketched in Figure 5 . The upper subplot represents the steady-state counterpart of the IC constraint (eq. 12). The upward-sloping curve is the gain in left tail risk from investing in the substandard …rm segment, ( !; ) =~ ( !; ) ( !; ), which under our distributional assumptions is an increasing function of the (normalized) face value of debt,
The horizontal line is the loss in mean return, E (!) Ẽ (!) = 1 R !dF (!; ). The IC constraint requires ! to be such that the gain in left tail risk from investing in the substandard technology does not exceed the loss in mean return. Since the constraint is binding in equilibrium, ! is determined by the intersection of both lines. Consider now an increase in cross-sectional volatility,
. Provided is increasing in (which holds under our distributional assumptions), then ceteris paribus the ( !; ) schedule shifts upwards and ! goes down. Intuitively, since higher volatility makes it more attractive for the bank to invest ine¢ ciently, the institutional investor reduces the (normalized) face value of debt so as to induce the former to invest e¢ ciently.
The lower subplot of Figure 5 represents the steady-state counterpart of the participation constraint,
. The latter represents an upward-sloping relationship between leverage, = (B j + N j )=N j , and the normalized face value of debt, !. 27 Ceteris paribus, the increase in has a double e¤ect on leverage. First, the leverage schedule shifts down, which reduces equilibrium leverage for a given !. Intuitively, higher volatility of island-speci…c shocks increases the downside risk ( !; ) of the assets that serve as collateral, which reduces the investor's expected payo¤; in order to induce the investor to lend, the bank reduces its demand for funds as a fraction of its net worth. Second, the reduction in ! through the IC constraint produces a leftward movement along the leverage schedule, thus further reducing equilibrium leverage. Both e¤ects are mutually reinforcing.
How does this volatility-leverage channel operate in general equilibrium? To analyze this, we simulate the model conditional on shocks to cross-sectional volatility. The results are shown in the fourth column of Table 4 . The model generates now large ‡uctuations in the leverage ratio and equity of banks, comparable to those in the data. It also produces somewhat larger ‡uctuations in assets than those generated by TFP shocks. The ‡uctuations in output are however relatively modest. In terms of correlations, volatility shocks produce a strong procyclicality in leverage with respect to GDP, well above the empirical range. It also produces a strong positive comovement between assets and leverage, within the range found in the data.
To understand these results, the red line in Figure 3 displays the responses to an increase in cross-sectional volatility. The shock produces a sharp reduction in the (normalized) face value of weighted by each component's share of GDP in the steady state. The investment share is higher in the RBC model (25.6%, versus 20% in our model), and thus more weight is put in the percentage investment change, which is much larger than that of consumption. 2 7 The investor's expected payo¤ is R A [ ! ( !)]. That is, the investor's exposure to island-speci…c risk is equivalent to holding cash in the amount ! and a short position in a put option with strike price ! (Merton, 1974; Adrian and Shin, 2011a). Since 0 ( !) = F ( !) < 1, the investor's expected payo¤ from lending to the bank increases with !. As a result, the bank can borrow more (as a fraction of its net worth) while still persuading the investor to lend the funds.
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bank debt, ! t = b t 1 =R A t , after the impact period. This fall in the debt commitment, together with the increase in uncertainty, produce a drastic reduction in the leverage ratio of banks, of about 5%. Banks'net worth increases after the impact period, due to the reduction in the default threshold ! t and hence the increase in the average return on assets for non-defaulting banks, R A t [1 ! t + t 1 ( ! t )]. However, the drop in leverage dominates the increase in net worth, as evidenced by the fall in bank assets. This produces a contraction in the capital stock, investment and aggregate output. 28 This volatility-leverage channel provides an alternative mechanism to the ones presented by Bloom et al. (2011) or Gilchrist et al. (2010) , through which changes in cross-sectional uncertainty may generate aggregate business cycles.
Finally, the second column in Table 4 shows the combined e¤ects of both TFP and volatility shocks in the model. The existence of two uncorrelated sources of ‡uctuations reduces the correlation of leverage and GDP to a level comparable to that in the data. Regarding the standard deviations, the unconditional volatility of aggregate output is dominated by TFP shocks, while that of leverage and equity is mostly determined by volatility shocks. The model underpredicts the volatility of banks'assets, while capturing fairly well the size of ‡uctuations in banks'leverage and equity.
Sensitivity analysis
We now study how robust these results are to alternative parametrizations. We …rst consider an alternative value for the steady-state leverage ratio, . Instead of calibrating it to the average across subsectors for the Great Moderation (18:3), we can calibrate it to match the mean leverage for a speci…c subsector, such as commercial banks (10:6). 29 The …fth column of Table 4 shows that the results are roughly similar to the those of the baseline model. There is a reduction in the volatility of leverage and equity and an increase in those of GDP and assets. In addition, there is an increase in the correlations of leverage with GDP and assets, and in the correlation of assets with GDP.
An alternative exercise involves the considering a di¤erent value for the exogenous bank continuation rate : As explained in section 4.1, this parameter was calibrated to 0.75, which is equivalent to assuming that banks pay o¤ dividends once a year on average. In the last column of Table 4 we analyze the case when this parameter takes a smaller value (0:5). 30 As in the previous case, there is a reduction in the volatilities of leverage and equity with respect to the baseline and an increase in those of GDP and assets. There is also an increase in the correlations of leverage with GDP and assets, in the correlation of assets with GDP and a reduction in the negative correlation of leverage with equity. 31 An alternative approach for choosing is to estimate it. We proceed as follows. We take US chartered commercial banks (the largest subsector in the US …nancial system) as a proxy for the leveraged …nancial system as a whole. As we have two shock processes (TFP and volatility), our information set contains two variables: TFP and equity capital for the period 1984Q1:2011Q3, both in log deviations from a linear trend. We employ Bayesian methods to estimate . We choose a Beta distribution as a prior, due to the fact that the latter distribution is bounded between 0 and 1. The prior mean is 0.75 and the standard error is set to 0.1. We employ a Metropolis Hasting algorithm with 2 chains and 10,000 replications per chain. The estimated posterior mean is 0.25, with a con…dence interval between 0.21 and 0.29.
The low estimated value for is the consequence of having estimated the model using data from commercial banks. Their equity volatility was relatively low (3.12 %, see Table 2 ), thus forcing to take a low value as we have seen that there is a positive relationship between both objects. It would be natural to take this value as a lower bound.
Given this estimation of , we compare the counterfactual evolution of the (un…ltered) model series of leverage and assets with those in the data. 32 Results are displayed in Figure 6 . In the case of the assets, the model seems to capture reasonably well the expansion in assets with respect to the trend in the mid-80s and the posterior contraction after the 'savings and loans' crisis. It also captures, albeit with a steeper trend, the expansion in assets prior to 2008 and the posterior collapse. The model, notwithstanding, fails to reproduce the high frequency movements in assets. In the case of leverage, the model does a better job, capturing both the low and the high-frequency components reasonably well.
The risk diversi…cation paradox
The exercises presented above seem to indicate that the model is able to roughly replicate the data in a number of dimensions. In particular, it can explain the bank leverage cycles observed in the data as the result of exogenous changes in cross-sectional volatility. Given these results, this section analyzes how di¤erent levels of average cross-sectional volatility may a¤ect the macroeconomy. We may indeed consider a scenario in which …nancial innovation allows banks to better diversify their risks. In terms of the model, this amounts to a reduction in the steady-state volatility of islandspeci…c shocks, : The question then is: what is the e¤ect of this …nancial innovation both on the mean level and the volatility of output.
To answer this question, we study the behavior of the model as we lower from its baseline value of 0:0373 to 0:0253. For the purpose of this exercise, we simulate the model with both TFP and volatility shocks. As shown in the …gure, a reduction in cross-sectional uncertainty allows banks to increase their leverage on average, through a mechanism very similar to the one explained before. For a given net worth, higher leverage allows banks to expand the size of their balance-sheets. This in turn leads to an increase in the stock of capital, and hence in the average level of output. Therefore, …nancial innovations that improve risk diversi…cation induce an economic expansion on average via an increase in capital accumulation. This results is not controversial and has been con…rmed by historical evidence, as discussed in Kindleberger (1986) .
The e¤ects on the volatilities are more striking. A reduction in cross-island volatility generates an increase in the volatility of output. For lack of a better name, we have named this e¤ect 'the risk diversi…cation' paradox, even though such a paradox is only apparent. A reduction in crossisland volatility increases the mean leverage of the banking sector, which in turn increases the size of ‡uctuations in leverage. The consequence is that a reduction in cross-island volatility leads to larger ‡uctuations in total intermediated assets. This in turn results in larger ‡uctuations in the capital stock, and hence in aggregate output. This unconditional result holds also conditionally on TFP shocks and volatility shocks. 33 This result is similar to the 'volatility paradox'of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011), although through a di¤erent mechanism (cross-section instead of aggregate volatility) and without the need of including any non-linear feedback loop.
The conclusion is that risk diversi…cation has both a positive level e¤ect on economic activity, and a negative e¤ect through an increase in aggregate volatility, where the latter is due to higher leverage. The optimal size of risk diversi…cation will depend on the degree risk aversion of the households, a point that we leave for further research.
We have presented empirical evidence regarding the balance sheet dynamics of …nancial intermediaries in the United States. We have found that ‡uctuations in leverage, equity and total assets are roughly of the same magnitude, and are all several times more volatile than GDP. Leverage actually contributes more than equity to ‡uctuations in total assets. We have also found that leverage is positively correlated with total assets and GDP, and negatively correlated with equity. These …nd-ings suggest the need to consider endogenous leverage within the context of macroeconomic models with …nancial intermediaries.
We have then built a general equilibrium model with …nancial intermediaries and endogenous leverage, and assessed its ability to match the evidence. The model incorporates a …nancial intermediation sector …nanced with short-term collateralized debt. The leverage ratio of …nancial intermediaries is endogenously determined as the result of a contracting problem between the latter and a sector of institutional investors. Due to moral hazard on the part of banks, institutional investors restrict their lending to a certain ratio of the former's net worth. In the model, TFP shocks produce rather small ‡uctuations in leverage, equity and assets, and fail to produce any meaningful comovement between leverage and GDP. Shocks to cross-sectional volatility do generate large ‡uctuations in assets and equity, as well as a positive (albeit excessively so) comovement between leverage and GDP. Combining TFP and volatility shocks allows the model to produce a procyclicality of leverage similar to that in the data.
Finally, we have shown that, in the context of our model, an economy with lower average crosssectional volatility has a higher average stock of capital and higher average output. However, it also has a higher output volatility. This stems from the fact that a lower perception of risk in asset returns leads to an increase in the leverage of …nancial intermediaries and to larger ‡uctuations in their lending activity.
subject to the participation constraint,
and the IC constraint
The …rst order condition with respect to N j t is given by
We can now guess that V 
From (22), we then have
. Using the latter, we can express the Bellman equation for V t (N 
respectively, where we have used b
. We also have the envelope condition
At this point, we guess that in equilibrium V t (N 
The …rst order conditions then become
where in (25) we have used the fact that j t times the left-hand side of (24) must be zero as required by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and in (26) we have used the fact that, according to our guess, V t+1 (0) = 0. Solving for the Lagrange multipliers, we obtain
ii ;
In the steady state, the Lagrange multipliers are
where we have used
Provided the parameter values are such that
then > 1, which in turn implies > 0. That is, both the participation and IC constraints hold in the steady state. 39 Provided aggregate shocks are su¢ ciently small, we will also have t > 1 and t > 0 along the cycle. But if t > 1, then our guess that V (27) and (28) our guess that t and t are symmetric across islands is veri…ed too.
The participation constraint (holding with equality) is given by
Using the latter to solve for A j t , we obtain
where we have also used the de…nition of the put option value,
Therefore, the leverage ratio A j t =N j t = t is equalized across …rms too. Finally, using
which is consistent with our guess that V t (N j t ) = t N j t only if
But the latter corresponds exactly with (27) without j subscripts, once we use the de…nition of t ( ! t+1 ). Our guess is therefore veri…ed. 3 9 Our calibration in Table 3 implies = 2:5528 and = 7:6371.
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C. Model summary and comparison to standard RBC model
Our model can be reduced to the following 11-equation system,
Y t = C t + I t (S4)
which jointly determine the dynamics of 11 endogenous variables: C t ; L t ; K t ; I t ; Y t ; R A t ; N t ; ! t ; b t ; t ; t . The standard RBC model is given by equations (S1) to (S5), plus the following investment Euler equation,
which jointly determine the path of 6 endogenous variables: C t ; L t ; K t ; I t ; Y t ; R A t . Note: Leverage is total assets divided by equity capital (both in dollars). 'Assets'in the table refer to real total assets, which are total assets (in dollars) divided by the GDP de ‡ator. All series are from the US Flow of Funds, except real GDP and the GDP de ‡ator which are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The sample period is 1963:Q1-2011:Q3. See Data Appendix for details. Leverage, real total assets and real GDP have been logged and detrended with a band-pass …lter that preserves cycles of 6 to 32 quarters (lag length K = 12). P-values of the test of no correlation against the alternative of non-zero correlation are reported in parenthesis. Asterisks denote statistical signi…cance of non-zero correlation at the 1% (***) and 5% (**) con…dence level. Note: Model statistics are obtained by simulating the model for 55,000 periods and discarding the …rst 5,000 observations. The model is solved using a second-order perturbation method. Both data and model-simulated series have been logged and detrended with a band-pass …lter that preserves cycles of 6 to 32 quarters (lag length K = 12). 
Tables and Figures
